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Abstract
This study investigates the amount and valence of information selected during single item evaluation. One hundred
and thirty-five participants evaluated a cell phone by reading hypothetical customers reports. Some participants were first
asked to provide a preliminary rating based on a picture of the phone and some technical specifications. The participants
who were given the customer reports only after they made a preliminary rating exhibited valence bias in their selection
of customers reports. In contrast, the participants that did not make an initial rating sought subsequent information in a
more balanced, albeit still selective, manner. The preliminary raters used the least amount of information in their final
decision, resulting in faster decision times. The study appears to support the notion that selective exposure is utilized in
order to develop cognitive coherence.
Keywords: selective exposure, evaluation behavior, confirmation bias, information sampling.
1 Introduction
In order to make accurate judgments it is critical that
decision-makers limit any biased processing of evidence
prior to the final choice. Yet, evidence suggests that bi-
ased processing of information frequently occurs during
judgment and decision-making (Brownstein, 2003). A
number of studies have demonstrated that people use both
selective exposure to information (e.g., Schulz-Hardt,
Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and selective pro-
cessing (e.g., Russo, Medvec, & Meloy, 1996) to bias
their judgments toward an early favorite, before the de-
cision is made. (See Brownstein, 2003, for review.) We
focus on the first of these phenomena, selective exposure
to information during evidence gathering. By “selective
exposure” we mean that people select evidence that they
expect to be able to use to support beliefs or options that
are already strong.
1.1 Selective exposure to information
Explanations of selective exposure to information are fre-
quently discussed in terms of cognitive dissonance the-
ory (Festinger, 1957, 1964). The theory proposed that,
having made a choice, negative affect is experienced as
∗Address: Peter A. F. Fraser-Mackenzie, School of Psychology,
University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, U.K. Email:
peter@fraser-mackenzie.co.uk.
a result of the negative aspects of the choice and the
positive aspects of alternatives. Thus selective expo-
sure to information is driven by a form of motivated rea-
soning (Kunda, 1990) to avoid negative affect. How-
ever, although dissonance theory was initially assumed to
be a post-decisional process, many studies demonstrate
that selective exposure can occur before making a final
choice.
According to Brownstein (2003) biases in processing
prior to making a choice may derive from the competition
between the competing alternatives and hence the need to
differentiate between the early favorite and the compet-
ing alternatives. Essentially, the biases are hypothesized
to derive from some form of motivated reasoning (Kunda,
1990), whereby individuals engage in a degree of selec-
tivity of exposure or biased evaluation of information to
support one choice over others. However, many everyday
tasks involve evaluating single items with no alternatives.
For example, we may be deciding whether or not to buy
an auction item, we may be evaluating a piece of evidence
as a member of a jury, we may be judging a speech made
by a member of parliament, or attempting to evaluate a
person’s character.
Whilst theories of motivated reasoning can account for
pre-decision biases prior to choice between competing
options or where we expect some personal stake in the
outcome, it is more difficult to understand how moti-
vated reasoning could account for hypothesis testing in
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the evaluation of a novel single item. Instead, Bond et
al. (2007) cite a more general effect of cognitive coher-
ence (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, Krawczyk, &
Holyoak, 2004; Simon, Snow, & Read, 2004) to account
for biased processing in novel single item evaluation. Al-
though they did not explore selective exposure explicitly,
they did demonstrate pre-commitment biases in the eval-
uation of attributes prior to judging a single novel item.
Accordingly, perhaps cognitive coherence may be used to
explain selective exposure in these other scenarios.
We hypothesize that evidence gathering during single
item evaluation may be driven by a need to gain a coher-
ent representation of the item, leading to violation of a
normative rule requiring fair consideration of all evalua-
tions. Thus, any initial disposition towards one evaluation
over another should be more likely to induce selective ex-
posure, whether it be a tenuous preliminary decisions, a
choice which initially appears to be promising, or a given
or self generated hypothesis to test. Evaluation of a sin-
gle item may be seen as a sequential process of collection
and evaluation of information with the aim of increasing
cognitive coherence to a specific point.
1.2 Sequential processing and selective ex-
posure
Jonas et al. (2001) explored selective exposure to infor-
mation with an accumulative paradigm comparing a se-
quential search task against a simultaneous search task.
A sequential search task allows participants to read each
selected item of information before they move on to the
next. A simultaneous search task forces participants to
select all the information they think they would like to
read before they see any of the results of their selec-
tions. Jonas et al. found that, when the information was
presented sequentially, the selectivity of exposure was
greater than when the information was presented simul-
taneously.
The fact that selective exposure effects are facilitated
by a sequential task suggests that information selectiv-
ity is not simply based upon a priori rules (either correct
or fallacious) but instead represents an ongoing and ac-
cumulative process of evidence gathering and feedback.
Indeed many recent models now opt for an accumulative
structure as a way of modeling deliberation (e.g., Buse-
meyer & Townsend, 1993; Link & Heath, 1975; Nosof-
sky & Palmeri, 1997; Ratcliff, 1978, Vickers, 1979).
Interestingly the descriptions of theories of biased pre-
decision processing have some strong similarities to se-
quential models.
The theories suggest: maximizing choice certainty
(Mills & O’Neal, 1971), bolstering intention until ready
to act (Kuhl, 1984; Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984), restruc-
turing the decision environment until full dominance oc-
curs (Montgomery, 1983, 1989), or differentiating until a
sufficiently superior alternative emerges (Svenson, 1992,
1996, 1999). Essentiall, all these theories imply that the
decision-maker must reach a critical point of differentia-
tion between elements at which the choice is made. We
argue that this point may depend upon the coherence of
the representation reaching an asymptotic level or thresh-
old.
The important aspect of these models is that they are
time related and hence they can predict deliberation times
depending upon the way information is processed. Given
a non-selective exposure to evidence, where information
varies in the extent that it is consistent with an initial
disposition, there will be a certain time taken before the
decision-maker finds a level of acceptable cognitive co-
herence. However, suppose the decision-maker seeks out
information only if it is expected to increase cognitive
coherence. This selectivity towards coherence would in-
crease the rate at which coherence is reached and the
models would predict faster decision times based upon
less information. Using cognitive coherence and sequen-
tial sampling models we can make a prediction concern-
ing the deliberation time and the exposure of informa-
tion in terms of volume. Given highly selective exposure,
fewer samples would have to be taken to reach the thresh-
old resulting in shorter deliberation times. Given less se-
lective exposure, more samples would have to be taken to
reach the threshold resulting in longer deliberation times.
In summary, we frequently perform evaluation of sin-
gle novel items in the absence of competing choices
or personally meaningful hypotheses. Although theo-
ries involving motivated reasoning would fail to pre-
dict anything in these cases, the theory of cognitive co-
herence predicts that selective exposure may still occur.
Therefore, this study focuses on two theoretical ques-
tions. Firstly, if cognitive coherence is important, then
we should observe selective exposure towards informa-
tion which increases coherence. Thus searching would
depend upon differentiating opinions which are impor-
tant to the individual. Given no initial preliminary dis-
position or past experiences, we hypothesize that a more
general search pattern will be observed driven by the in-
formation structure; more bottom-up information selec-
tivity. Given a preliminary disposition, coherence can be
achieved through selective exposure aiming to differen-
tiate the initial disposition from alternative evaluations,
more top-down information selectivity. Secondly, models
of sequential sampling, when applied to both the theories
of cognitive coherence and biased pre-decision process-
ing, predict that deliberation time should be negatively
related to the degree of selective exposure as it facilitates
the rate at which the asymptotic level of coherence is met.
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Figure 1: The image of the phone and the specifications.
2 The study
The task chosen was rating a hypothetical cell/mobile
telephone as one might in an online shop like Ama-
zon.com, i.e., rating the phone on a five point scale. The
search task involved searching through a number of opin-
ionated hypothetical reviews written by customers con-
cerning the phone. The reviews ranged on a 5 point
scale from highly negative to highly favorable. In or-
der to generate a measurable disposition, we asked par-
ticipants to provide an initial rating based upon limited
specifications, before asking them to examine the opin-
ionated reviews. Thus we may observe different selective
exposure between different preliminary raters. Also, par-
ticipants who are asked to provide an initial rating may
demonstrate different patterns of information exposure,
compared to a control group that viewed the same spec-
ifications but did not provide an initial rating. Although
the control group did not outwardly provide a rating, they
may have formed a disposition nonetheless. Therefore,
we used a second control group that did not even view
the specifications prior to the information search.
Thus, we had three groups that differed in their ex-
perience prior to information searching experience. Pre-
liminary raters (PR) viewed specifications and then pro-
vided an initial rating. Specification-only controls (SOC)
viewed specifications but did not rate the phone. Finally,
No-experience controls (NEC) neither viewed specifica-
tion nor rated the phone.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
In total, 135 University students were recruited via an on-
line advertisement and were rewarded with course cred-
its. There were 96 female and 39 male participants; their
ages ranged from 18 to 59 (M =21.94, SD = 6.05).
2.1.2 Design
There were three different between-subjects groups (Pre-
liminary raters, Specifications-only controls, and No-
experience controls). There was one within-subjects in-
dependent variable, the type of opinionated review, of
which there were five levels. 1-Star opinions hated the
phone and reported its worst features in their reviews.
2-Star opinions did not like the phone and mainly re-
ported its bad features. 3-Star opinions thought the phone
was okay and reported equal amounts of positive and
negative attributes. 4-Star opinions liked the phone and
mainly reported its good attributes, and 5-Star opinions
loved the phone and only reported its good attributes.
Three reviews were written for each type of opinion re-
sulting in 15 items of information for the decision-maker
to search through. We recorded the initial rating by the
preliminary-rater group and the final ratings by all par-
ticipants. Thus we can observe any differences in search
pattern by both how they finally rated the phone and how
preliminary raters first rated the phone. We recorded the
number of reviews selected for reading, in each opinion
type and the amount of time spent reading each review.
2.1.3 Procedure
Participants were given an information and consent form,
before being asked to complete the computer task. All
groups were informed that they were to evaluate a cell
phone. The preliminary-rater group and specifications-
only group were presented with a screen showing a pic-
ture of the cell phone and non-opinionated specifications
about its size, weight, battery time etc (Figure 1). They
clicked on an arrow when they were ready to continue.
The preliminary raters were then shown a screen ask-
ing them to provide a preliminary rating of the phone.
They were then taken to the review menu page. The
specifications-only control group skipped the preliminary
rating page and went straight to the review menu. The
no-experience controls were taken straight to the review
menu and were not shown the specifications or the pre-
liminary rating page.
The review menu displayed 15 boxes each one repre-
senting the fifteen reviews in a 3 x 5 grid with the five
opinion types clearly identified across the top and the
three reviews of each positioned vertically underneath
each other. So for example, to view the second review
by the user who thought the phone was “okay” (3-stars),
the participant would click on the second review down in
the third column. After reading a review the participant
clicked on the arrow, which led back to the review menu.
The program recorded which reviews were read and for
how long.
Participants in all groups could click on and read as
many reviews as they liked until they were satisfied,
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Table 1: Participants recruited for each group and their mean preliminary and final ratings out of 5 stars
Number of
participants
Mean preliminary
rating
SD preliminary
rating Mean final rating SD final rating
Preliminary raters 60 2.77 .65 2.83 .668
Specification-
only
controls
28 - - 2.75 .645
No-experience
controls 47 - - 2.94 .763
Total 135 2.77 .65 2.85 .697
whereupon they clicked on the arrow at the bottom, which
took them to the final rating page. Here the participants
were asked to make their evaluation of the phone on the
five point scale, indicated by stars.
2.1.4 Materials
The image and the specifications of the cell phone were
fabricated for the study (see Figure 1 for an example).
Each review was the same length, of 100 words. This
allowed us to compare reading times between reviews.
The following is an example of a 1-star review.
1 Star- “Hated the Phone”
Review 1
I absolutely hated this phone. I used to have
a nice top of the range phone but had to use
this as an interim measure. It was a big step
down from what I was used to. It was bigger
and heavier, which was surprising as there was
less in it, and it looked ugly. I also found it dif-
ficult to use in loud environments because the
sound quality was so bad. In the end, I got rid
of it as soon as I could. I would never get one
of these again! Don’t buy this phone it is abso-
lutely horrendous!
2.2 Results and discussion
2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
One hundred and thirty five participants were recruited
with the greatest number in the preliminary rater group.
This larger preliminary rater group was recruited to allow
analysis between different preliminary ratings. Table 1
shows the number of participants in each group and their
mean preliminary and final ratings. A one way ANOVA
showed no significant difference between the groups in
their final rating, F(2, 134) = .661, p >.05.
2.2.2 Exploration of search patterns — valence bias
This analysis examined the distribution of search pat-
terns between the preliminary raters, the specifications-
only controls and the no-experience controls. As we are
initially concerned with valence selectivity of their total
search time we examined the proportion of reviews read
in each opinion category by each participant. So, the pro-
portion of 1-star opinions read for each participant would
be the total number of 1-star reviews that they read, di-
vided by the total number of reviews read by that partici-
pant. This controls for the predicted variances in volume
between groups or individuals.
Figure 2 (top left graph) displays the proportion of
reviews selected for reading based upon the experience
prior to the search task. The results appear to demonstrate
a consistent quartic (w-shaped) search pattern across all
groups. This was supported by a 2-way, mixed-design,
repeated measures ANOVA which compared the different
groups (preliminary raters, specification-only controls,
no-experience controls) by their search pattern (propor-
tion of reviews read from each category). The first part of
the analysis found a significant overall effect of star rat-
ing on the proportion of reviews read across all groups
(search strategy), F(3.46, 456.12)1 = 15.50, p < .001.
Bonferroni post hoc tests confirmed the quartic pattern
revealing significantly more reviews read in the 1,3 and
5, star categories than in the 2 and 4 star catagories (p <
.001 for all). No other comparisons were significant.
There was also a significant interaction between the
search pattern and three groups (preliminary raters,
specification-only controls, and no-experience controls),
F(6.91, 456.12), = 2.08, p < .05. This indicates that there
may be some effect on information selection depending
upon the experience prior to the main search task. The
1Degrees of freedom were corrected for all ANOVA tests using
Greenhouse-Geisser correction due to a violation of the sphericity as-
sumption.
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Figure 2: Top left panel displays the overall search pattern distributions by each of the three groups. The other panels
display each group separately, showing search patterns based upon their final rating.
quartic search pattern in Figure 2 (top left panel) indi-
cates a degree of selective exposure by all groups, not in
the sense of search biased by an initial tendency, but se-
lective in the sense of sampling central and extreme cases
more than others.
A 2-way, mixed-design, repeated measures, ANOVA
was performed on the controls data to explore their search
patterns alone. The test revealed a significant difference
across reviews F(3.05, 222.36), = 24.97, p = .000. Bon-
ferroni post hoc tests confirmed again, the quartic pattern
revealing a significant more reviews read in the 1 and 5
star categories than in the 2, 3, and 4-star catagories (p <
.001 for all). In addition, significantly more reviews were
read in the 3-star category than the 2-star (p < .01) and 4-
star (p < .04) category but also significantly less than the
1-star (p < .01) and 5-star (p < .05) category. However, no
significant difference between the two control groups in
their overall search pattern was found, F(3.05, 222.36),
= 1.98, p > .05. As there was no difference between
controls on their overall search patterns, we combined
these into one control group. A further 2-way repeated
measures ANOVA found a significant difference between
preliminary raters and combined controls in their over-
all search pattern F(3.33, 436.11), = 3.16, p < .05. This
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indicates that, based upon search pattern, there is a signif-
icant effect of making a preliminary rating on subsequent
information exposure.
In order to determine where these effects might lie, we
divided all three groups (preliminary raters, specification-
only controls and no-experience controls) into further
subgroups based upon their final rating. As only two par-
ticipants finally rated the phone with one star and no par-
ticipants rated it with five stars, we excluded these partic-
ipants from the subsequent analysis. Figure 2 (top right
and bottom graphs) shows the search patterns by each
group and their final ratings. A three-way, mixed- design,
repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the data
revealing a significant interaction between the group and
the search pattern depending on the final rating, F(13.78,
427.08), = 2.62, p < .001. From Figure 2 it is clear
that when we are asked to make a preliminary rating,
our search patterns are significantly different than if we
simply view some specifications or have no experience.
Specifically, the quartic pattern is replaced by selective
exposure which strongly relates to the final judgment. To
determine how the preliminary rating affected our partic-
ipants selective exposure we also examined the prelimi-
nary raters by themselves. A 2-way repeated measures
ANOVA examining the differences between the prelim-
inary raters showed that they exhibited significantly dif-
ferent search patterns based upon their initial rating, F(8,
220) = 5.410, p = .000. A further linear regression analy-
sis determined that the initial rating was highly predictive
of final rating, F(1, 59) = 110.49, p <.001, R=.81.
The results confirm that providing initial ratings
changed the way subsequent information was sought.
However, this analysis does not reveal precisely what in-
formation was important to preliminary raters. Thus, we
performed a subsequent analysis ordering the information
depending on whether the review rating would have least
dissonance (align with the preliminary rating), most dis-
sonance (furthest distance from the preliminary rating),
or reside somewhere in between.
The means, shown in Figure 3, were compared using
a repeated measures ANOVA, which found a significant
effect of the distance between the preliminary rating and
the review valence on the proportion of reviews read, F(2,
118) = 12.44, p < .001, which appears as a U-shaped re-
lationship. Indeed, Bonferroni post-hoc t-tests revealed
that, while there was no significant difference between
the number of most dissonant and least dissonant reviews
asked for (p > .05), significantly more information was
sought in the least and most dissonant categories than
in the categories between these two poles (p < .001 for
both).
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Figure 3: Mean number of reviews read by preliminary
raters depending on the distance between the preliminary
rating and the valence of the review.
We argue that these results demonstrate that selective
exposure is used to increase cognitive coherence in the
developing representation through increasing the differ-
entiation of opinions. Given no initial disposition (no-
experience controls) or a possibly weak or undefined one
(specifications-only controls), selectivity appeared more
driven by the task structure. Thus, the quartic search
strategy of our controls represents attention to informa-
tion that appears as if it would increase the coherence
of the representation, that is, increase differentiation of
opinions. This is achieved by viewing the worst and the
best reviews and to a lesser extent a middle anchor point.
The 2- and 4-star reviews act to undermine this coherent
differentiation of opinions and so they tend to be ignored.
We suggest that a stronger, or at least more defined,
initial disposition is formed through a preliminary rating.
This disposition results in a change in the representation
of the task. Now the differentiation must be between the
individual’s initial disposition and furthest opposite opin-
ions. Again, only information that is specifically going
to increase this differentiation is selected. Participants
are concerned with information that both confirms their
initial opinions, and also the most dissonant opinions.
So rather than examining the full spectrum of opinions
it seems that people simplify the task by looking at the
most different opinions as these are the most informative
in terms of differentiation. This results in the quickest un-
derstanding of the range of opinions allowing an coherent
representation to be formed efficiently.
Alternatively, it is possible that the most extreme and
central ratings are objectively most informative. Future
research must settle this question.
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Table 2: Total time and amount of information sought prior to the final rating depending on initial experience
Mean total time spent
information
searching (seconds)
Std. deviation
mean total number of
reviews read
Std. deviation
Preliminary raters 45.98 36.20 4.42 2.86
Specification-only
control
56.32 48.62 4.96 3.31
No-experience
control
74.72 39.74 6.13 3.45
2.2.3 Effect on decision time — volume bias
Figure 2 shows that preliminary raters’ search patterns
differ from the control’s quartic trends, suggesting some
change occurring in the approach evaluators have to col-
lecting evidence after providing an initial rating. We con-
sidered that selective exposure may be a tool to increase
cognitive coherence and that this may also have a mea-
surable impact on decision times.
In order to examine volume differences in evidence
collection we need to examine the total amount of infor-
mation sought as a function of group (preliminary raters,
specifications-only controls, and no-experience controls).
The theory predicts that the faster a coherent representa-
tion is formed then the quicker the overall search time
should be.
The results of a one-way independent ANOVA demon-
strate that for the “mean total time spent information
searching” dependent measure there was a significant ef-
fect of the experience prior to information searching F(2,
132) = 6.75, p =.002, with the preliminary-rating group
taking less time than the others. For the “mean total num-
ber of reviews read” dependent measure there was also a
significant effect of initial experience, F(2, 132) = 3.89,
p =.023, with the preliminary-rater group reading fewer
reviews. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed a significant
difference between the preliminary-rater group and the
no-experience control group for both dependent measures
(p < .001, p < .05 respectively). The specifications only
control was not significantly different from either group
in either measure (p > .05 for both) although a significant
linear trend was found across groups for the dependent
measures (p < .05 for both).
These results indicate that a preliminary judgment
leads to quicker decisions, compared to a control with no
experience. Due to a lack of statistical difference between
the specification-only group and the others we cannot be
sure whether the volume difference is due to forming an
initial judgment or simply viewing evidence. Neverthe-
less, these results are still important as they demonstrated
that the amount of information required at the review
stage is dependent on initial experiences. This quicker
decision time is precisely what would be expected if a
decision threshold was being met faster due to cognitive
coherence being reached at a faster rate than controls.
3 General discussion
In summary, the control groups demonstrated a strong
preference to explore the 1- and 5-star ratings and, to a
lesser extent, the 3-star ratings. The no-experience con-
trols sought the most information in the review stage. The
preliminary rater group was biased towards reading re-
views with the same star rating as the participant’s initial
judgement, but this group also examined the most disso-
nant information. Overall, the preliminary raters sought
the least information in the review stage. Thus, we ob-
served a degree of selectivity in all groups, whereby cer-
tain types of review were selected over others; a within
subjects selectivity effect. Furthermore, this selectivity
was different depending whether not a preliminary de-
cision was made, and we observed selective exposure
that was specific to that preliminary rating, a between-
subjects selectivity effect.
While more recent studies have focused upon biases
in selective exposure towards confirming information
(Jonas, et al., 2001; Pinkley, Griffith, & Northcraft, 1995;
Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Frey, 1981; Johnston, 1996),
early studies found that people were frequently interested
in dissonant information. For example, Gerard (1967)
found that participants spent more time looking at the al-
ternative they eventually rejected than the alternative they
accepted. Indeed, in a study during the 1964 American
Elections, participants were offered brochures supporting
either their favored candidate or his rival (Lowin, 1967).
When the arguments in the sample were strong, it was
found that participants ordered more brochures from their
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 4, No. 4, June 2009 Selective information sampling 314
candidate. However, when the arguments in the sample
were weak, and hence easier to refute, it was found that
participants were more likely to select brochures from the
rival (Baron, 2008). In a similar study Albarracin and
Mitchell (2004), investigated the relationship between at-
titude strength and selective exposure. Specifically, it was
found that participants who felt confident in their ability
to defend their argument were more likely to select dis-
sonant information.
This demonstrates two ways in which selective ex-
posure can be used to develop a coherent representa-
tion. Either by selecting confirming information to help
strengthen the associations, or by selecting dissonant in-
formation which may be discredited and help inhibit the
strength of rival evaluations. In our study we observed
both. We suggest that this particular finding is perhaps
only observable because we offered participants a range
of information from more dissonant to less dissonant
whereas most previous studies have only offered two cat-
egories; either confirming or disconfirming. We observed
selectivity towards the extremes, but these extremes de-
pended upon the individual and their subjective represen-
tation of the task.
We propose that these results represent selective ex-
posure with the aim of developing a significantly coher-
ent representation of the item through the task. Given
a strong initial disposition, coherence may be achieved
rapidly through specific search strategies aimed at in-
creasing differentiation between that early disposition
and the opposite opinions. Thus we describe this as top-
down driven selective exposure. Confirming information
is collected and accepted and dissonant information is
collected and discredited. Given no initial disposition,
developing a coherent representation is more difficult as
information selectivity cannot be driven by hypotheses.
Thus searching still involves selectivity, yet this is more
driven by the way the information is displayed than any
specific hypotheses. Thus, we define this as bottom-up
information selectivity.
Cognitive coherence has the ability to explain a wide
range of pre-decisional biases, from cognitive dissonance
and biased evaluation during choice between competing
options, to unbiased but selective exposure during single
item evaluation. Furthermore, the parsimony of its ac-
count is appealing, as it explains the phenomena simply
through our natural drive to seek out patterns and rela-
tionships in order to understand our environment.
3.1 Future directions
On the basis of this study we offer some considerations of
future studies. We demonstrated that preliminary ratings
influence selective exposure. However, it would be in-
teresting to determine how initial dispositions are formed
during single item evaluation. Perhaps, a study could pro-
vide different sets of specifications either positive or neg-
ative and explore whether selective exposure similar to
our preliminary raters can be observed without the need
of an initial rating. Another example would be to ex-
plore whether there is a difference between search pat-
terns based upon the source of bias (e.g., either by oneself
or by another).
Furthermore, it may be interesting to examine the ex-
tent to which cognitive coherence may also explain other
cognitive biases. Firstly it would be interesting to explore
the extent to which other biases in our reasoning and ev-
idence gathering are active (driven by motivated reason-
ing) or passive (driven by a basic need of coherence). In
addition, the extent to which bias in our reasoning and ev-
idence gathering changes from bottom-up (driven by the
way information is displayed) to more top-down (driven
by some initial disposition).
Finally, we explored a novel contribution to selective
exposure, through the examination of deliberation time
and differences in the volume of information sought. Fur-
ther studies might examine different predictors of differ-
ences in the volume of information sampling and decision
thresholds. That is, when do we decide to stop searching
for evidence and make a judgement depending on differ-
ent initial dispositions or tasks? Also, it might be im-
portant to explore how much information is normatively
optimal in different scenarios. The interplay between
decision-thresholds and initial biases is particularly in-
teresting and relates to many real-life scenarios from
criminal investigations (Dror & Fraser-Mackenzie, 2008)
and forensic decision-making (Dror & Rosenthal, 2008;
Charlton, Fraser-Mackenzie & Dror, in press) to gam-
bling decisions under time pressure (Dror, Busemeyer &
Basola, 1999).
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